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Abstract
While the rise of neoliberal discourse in Australia during the term of the Howard government 
(1996–2007) has long been recognised, its relationship to changing understandings of 
citizenship is rarely theorised except in terms of economic ideology. However, neoliberalism 
can also be conceived as a political rationality whose logics are ultimately concerned with the 
regulation of human conduct. This article contends that the Australian Citizenship Test can be 
understood as part of such a process of regulation, and that analysing it in terms of neoliberal 
and liberal (neo/liberal) political rationalities demonstrates the extent to which the Howard 
government’s multicultural policy was actually enabled by its predecessor, thereby providing a 
more nuanced understanding of how the test came to be a meaningful solution to the ‘problem’ 
of difference.
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Introduction
The years spanning the Hawke–Keating government (1983–1996) and Howard government 
(1996–2007) have often been identified as a transformative period in Australian political 
culture with the advent of neoliberalism and the subsequent decline of social liberalist 
logics.1 It was in this period that neoliberalism gained both a political and cultural foothold, 
acquiring rapid legitimacy as an economic project while also reconfiguring the role of 
government in its rearticulation of market behaviour. This period also saw an increasingly 
strident debate regarding national identity and the ‘problem’ of difference within Australian 
society, driven by the conflict between the economic imperative for immigration and the 
challenge this posed to a nation that had historically been imagined as racially and culturally 
homogeneous.2 This conflict played out most explicitly in the engagement with Australian 
citizenship which, in accordance with modern understandings of the institution, was by this 
time formally nondiscriminatory, or ‘inclusive’. The migrant policy of the period was thus 
intimately concerned with reconciling this commitment to inclusive citizenship with particular 
conceptions of cultural difference and national cohesion, a tension that was addressed through 
the discourse of multiculturalism. 
It is the contention of this article that these conceptions form part of the political 
rationalities of liberalism and neoliberalism and that citizenship comes to be considered as 
inclusive or exclusive according to these logics. It is thus important to acknowledge the ways 
in which these political rationalities were deployed over this period to reconfigure citizenship 
as ‘inclusive’ under the rubric of multiculturalism, in order to better understand its particular 
regulatory effects. In particular, it wishes to reconsider the introduction of a citizenship test by 
the Howard government in 2007, which the existing literature contextualises as a particular 
political strategy of the Howard government rather than a product of contemporary political 
discourse more broadly.3 Thus, while neo/liberalism occupies much attention in other studies 
of Australian politics, its relationship to the Australian Citizenship Test and exclusive 
citizenship practices generally has been under theorised, largely because it is considered only in 
terms of economically motivated policies either driving, or driven by, socially conservative and 
racially discriminatory agendas.4 
The limits to this approach become apparent when we consider the points at which the 
economic imperatives of neoliberalism and racialised exclusion fail to intersect. To take a 
prominent example, Jon Stratton offers the most in-depth account of neoliberalism and 
its intersection with racial exclusion in Australia, but his analysis is limited by a narrow 
conception of neoliberalism in terms of its economic concerns alone and, as a result, implies 
rather than theorises the link between the two logics. Stratton’s critique is based on the claim 
that neoliberalism has brought about an ‘exclusionary order’ in which:
The state’s relationship with its members, whether citizens or not, is founded on an 
idea of an economic, rather than social, contract. The most excluded are those who, 
from the economic point of view of the neoliberal state, have the least to offer.5
Following Margaret Somers, he explains the rise of nationalism as the result of this 
‘contractualisation’ of citizenship, which empties it of civic identity and leaves only ethno-
cultural identity in its place.6 At the same time, he points to this death of the social contract 
as evidence of a growing individualism.7 Where in this schema can we place Howard’s 
increasingly blatant appeals to national family and unity?8 This contradiction is never addressed 
directly by Stratton, but he does suggest that the xenophobic nationalism surrounding asylum 
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seekers was a ‘manufactured crisis’ which justified the imposition of neoliberal economic 
policies:
the engineering of the Australian population’s anxieties and fears around race and 
immigration, which was a crucial factor in the election of the Coalition in 1996, and 
which were embodied in asylum seekers, served the same purpose for the 11 years the 
Coalition was in office.9 
Thus, even when scholars focus explicitly on neoliberalism, they explain its implication in, as 
well as divergence from, a racialised nationalism by turning to personal political agendas and 
biases. This understanding of neoliberalism as an economic ideology promoted by political 
actors does not account for the complex ways in which it interacts with and adapts to the logic 
of exclusive citizenship.
Moreover, this approach obscures the continuities in logic that might exist even between 
ideologically opposed actors and, in the same vein, treats liberalism and neoliberalism as 
discrete rationales without considering how the one has been foundational to the other. In 
particular, the dismantling of multiculturalism is often attributed to John Howard’s neoliberal, 
socially conservative agenda without an acknowledgement of the extent to which it built 
upon the terms set by the Hawke government’s multicultural policy and its construction 
of a British-derived, uniquely liberal Australian national identity.10 While critics of liberal 
multiculturalism such as Stratton do link the implicit privileging of Anglo-Australian culture 
in earlier multicultural policy with the Howard government’s more blatant nationalist rhetoric, 
they examine this continuity in terms of Australia’s racist heritage and the prejudices it has 
instilled in the core ‘white’ nation.11 Turning again to Stratton, he suggests: 
In this new exclusionary order based in economic obligation the assumption … was 
that non-market, socio-cultural considerations such as race, ethnicity, religion would 
disappear, at least in the economic world ... This turned out not to be the case; I am 
tempted to add: of course.12
This ‘of course’ and what it implies does not account for how the exclusivity of citizenship 
is reconfigured or made intelligible by neoliberalism, but simply assumes such exclusion, 
racial or otherwise, is an unchanging process compatible with and therefore perpetuated by 
neoliberalism. It seems clear that neoliberalism is compatible with racial exclusion and socially 
conservative logics, despite economic imperatives that would suggest this should not be so. 
For this reason, it is important to consider the ways that ‘[n]eo-liberal logic redeploys these 
regimes of race and ethnicity while simultaneously transcoding them into the terms of its own, 
seemingly racially unmarked, economies of morality and value’.13 
To do so, neoliberalism must be scrutinised as something more than an economic rationale 
but as a political rationality that, ‘while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily 
focused on the economy; it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions 
and social action’.14 Thus, while neoliberalism can certainly be understood in terms of the desire 
for state protection of free markets, and liberalism likewise as the desire for individual freedom 
from state control, these rationalities are also worth theorising in terms of the assumptions 
that underwrite these desires, which are concerned with individual and collective human 
behaviour and the need for their regulation by the state. In these terms, citizenship is capable 
of defining membership in a nation not only through the designation of formal rights but also 
through its production of subjects in whom the right to inclusion within the imagined national 
space is made natural (and therefore invisible and uncontested) or provisional (and therefore 
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open to regulation). Exclusion is thus conceived as an effect of discursive limits, or the ways in 
which political rationalities determine the grounds on which citizens are re/produced. 
In this schema, neo/liberalism has a genealogy, it is a rationality with a particular (racist, 
colonialist) history, and its operative terms of freedom, culture and difference are likewise born 
of this history. This approach has proved fruitful for other studies of exclusion, particularly 
surrounding race and immigration.15 These works, in their sensitivity to the genealogies 
of these terms, are able to theorise ‘how histories of racial domination continue to shape 
difference today, why, how, and by whom liberal values are determined to be superior … and 
how the state regulates various modalities of difference’.16 This article seeks to contribute to 
a growing body of work that considers these questions in the context of citizenship,17 with 
one point of difference: such tests, as techniques of regulation, produce ‘included’ as well as 
‘excluded’ subjects and it is important not to forget the former in understanding the operation 
of the latter. As this article demonstrates, the regulatory power of Australia’s ‘inclusive’ 
multicultural citizenship has implications for all its citizen-subjects. 
It is this article’s contention that the Australian Citizenship Test belongs to such a process 
of regulation that extends back to the Hawke government and its development of Australia’s 
first official multicultural policy, and that analysing this process as a product of neo/liberal 
discourses, with their attendant notions of individual freedom and cultural difference, provides 
a more nuanced understanding of the political conditions in which the Test came to be a 
meaningful solution to the ‘problem’ of difference. It thus focuses not on the Test’s content 
but on what its implementation can tell us about how governments have viewed the act of 
governing and the properties of the governed, and thereby to understand how they have 
governed difference. To this end, it will consider the multicultural policy papers produced 
by the Hawke and Howard governments, and analyse the discourses at play within them to 
interpret the ways they intersect with a formally inclusive citizenship to regulate difference and 
reproduce exclusion. Furthermore, approaching these policy papers as products of a neo/liberal 
political rationality specifically reveals a continuity towards the question of difference—despite 
personal or party ideology—that has often been obscured in historical accounts. In these 
terms, the discourses engaged by the Hawke and Howard governments can be understood as 
contributions to the same neo/liberal framework in which difference came to be regulated and 
exclusion justified. 
This framework was co-constituted by several moves, which this article will examine in 
turn. First, it considers the Hawke government’s National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia 
and its privatisation of culture and depoliticisation of difference. It then turns to the Howard 
government’s A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia, which built upon its predecessor by 
more explicitly placing collective cultural difference outside the scope of the political sphere. 
It also traces how this was supplemented by the depoliticisation of national identity; to the 
extent that liberalism was invoked as a limiting framework, and this framework presented as 
culturally neutral, the ‘core’ of Australian national identity remained off the table of political 
contestation. The article then considers how this depoliticised Australian identity formed the 
heart of the New Agenda’s next move, which was to naturalise the capacity for self-regulation 
to ‘native’ Australians (articulated in terms of ‘core’ values), a move that necessarily implicated 
the migrant and legitimated calls for their integration into a homogenous Australian culture. 
Finally, the article turns to the implementation of the Citizenship Test, which was positioned 
within this framework as a tool for assessing the capacity of potential migrants to become 
suitably self-governing and, as a result, justified their regulation in the defence of a free 
Australian society. The argument being made is thus two-fold: first, both governments were 
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implicated in the reproduction of an exclusive cultural hierarchy through the rubric of an 
inclusive multicultural citizenship; and second, this rubric was a product of neo/liberal political 
logic. As such, any study of its effects must be considerate of these logics.
Privatising difference
Since its official inception as policy by the Fraser government (1975–1983), multiculturalism 
had received bipartisan support under its terms of social justice and equal opportunity as 
defined in the 1978 Galbally Report. However, the question of immigration was brought to 
the fore in the 1980s and with it questions regarding Australian national identity and what 
place, if any, multiculturalism had within it. In 1984, historian Geoffrey Blainey launched 
an attack on what he characterised as elite social engineering which preferenced Asian 
immigration and encouraged immigrants to remain apart from mainstream Australian culture; 
multiculturalism thus threatened the social cohesion of the nation by ‘turning Australia into 
a nation of tribes’.18 Shortly after came the release of the FitzGerald Report, a government-
commissioned inquiry into immigration that was highly critical of multiculturalism, 
identifying it as harmful to immigration policy due to its confusing and divisive nature. The 
FitzGerald Report was primarily concerned with immigration’s role in increasing Australia’s 
economic competitiveness and, to that end, it made recommendations both to change selection 
criteria in favour of economic utility and to ameliorate the damaging effect of multiculturalism 
by reinforcing the value of citizenship. According to the report, multiculturalism ‘did not 
seem to have enhanced the two-way commitment which is so essential to immigration’s 
success’.19 The report identified this lack of commitment as a threat to national solidarity 
since it devalued citizenship; it thus made an explicit connection between cultural difference, 
national cohesion and the obligations of citizens to the nation. In response to the FitzGerald 
Report, the government produced the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: Sharing 
Our Future, a policy paper that attempted to reconcile the concern for national cohesion 
with the maintenance of individual liberal freedoms. The most apparent aim of the Agenda—
and the one most directly tied to the criticisms made by the FitzGerald Report—was the 
reframing of multiculturalism as a policy for ‘everyone’. The Agenda sought to counter claims 
that multiculturalism was both divisive and driven by special interest groups through the 
construction of difference as diversity, privatising difference by circumscribing it to the 
individual and configuring it as a commodity for national cohesion. 
The Agenda was a product of the growing conflict between the incumbent political 
rationality of social liberalism and the newer logic of neoliberalism (which in fact hailed back 
to certain classical liberal precepts). There was a continual tension between opposing concepts 
of the national good, in neoliberal terms defined as economic efficiency driven by privatisation 
and in social liberal terms as state intervention guaranteeing equal access to some broadly 
conceived notion of ‘the good life’.20 This tension was reconciled in the Agenda through an 
emphasis on individual rights as the site on which difference could be acknowledged and thus 
acted upon by the state. Furthermore, these rights were figured not only in terms of access to 
resources but also in the recognition of identity:
Fundamentally, multiculturalism is about the rights of the individual—the right 
to equality of treatment; to be able to express one’s identity; to be accepted as an 
Australian without having to assimilate to some stereotyped model of behaviour.21
The inclusion of cultural identity has been singled out as a particular innovation of the 
Agenda, signalling the advent of multiculturalism as a distinct political strategy.22 Yet the 
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paper’s articulation of cultural identity was largely indebted to certain liberal conceptions of 
culture and individual identity as necessarily limited to the private sphere.23 Crucially, the right 
to the maintenance of cultural identity came with a proviso at the outset of the Agenda where, 
as one of the dimensions of multiculturalism, it was defined as ‘the right of all Australians, 
within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage’.24 These 
limits were later defined as ‘the Constitution and the rule of law, tolerance and equality, 
Parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language 
and equality of the sexes’.25 Culture was thus figured as individual identity and its expression 
circumscribed within the private sphere; insofar as this cultural identity was privatised, it 
remained under the purview of individual liberal freedom. Yet this freedom had a limit; there 
was an implicit suggestion in this construction of culture that cultural difference as a collective 
political force posed a threat to the core tenets of Australian culture—which had at their heart 
the defence of individual freedom—and it is for this reason that the imposition of a limit to 
cultural difference was not only justified, but justified under the terms of freedom itself. As 
Geoffrey B. Levey notes of the policy:
Cultural minorities qua groups have no entitlement. This qualification is of the utmost 
importance. It means that Australian multiculturalism remains committed to the 
liberal idea that the ultimate unit of moral worth is the individual, and it avoids one 
of the traditional liberal concerns about group and cultural rights; namely, that the 
interests and rights of the individual may be jeopardised in the interests of the group.26
Thus, despite the Agenda’s insistence that Australian identity ‘evolves and changes over time’,27 
it also ultimately reaffirmed the limit to this change in redefining Australian culture, which 
was articulated as a matter of safeguarding freedom:
Multiculturalism does not mean that we should dismantle or repudiate our institutions 
in order to start afresh. Our British heritage is extremely important to us ... It has 
created a society remarkable for the freedom it can give to its individual citizens [emphasis 
added].28
Depoliticising difference
This particular configuration of culture and difference was subsumed within the discourse 
of diversity, which privatised and commodified difference in order to depoliticise it, thereby 
ameliorating its potential political antagonisms and securing national cohesion. This 
depoliticisation was achieved by the Agenda in two ways: it first produced a split between 
good and bad diversity and, in doing so, both reproduced and regulated difference, as well 
as legitimating the need for its management. The differentiation between good and bad 
diversity is located in the underlying function of the discourse of diversity as ‘a rationality of 
integration: it ceases to be a divisive force when it is good, and anchored in shared values’.29 
This concern with division was central to the Agenda, whose primary aim was to defend 
multiculturalism against the criticism of divisiveness, which it attempted through an emphasis 
on ‘sharing’ and signalled overtly in its subtitle, ‘Sharing Our Future’. According to the 
Agenda: ‘Multiculturalism is concerned to encourage all Australians, including those from 
non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds, to share their diversity of cultures, rather than excluding one 
another or being forced into separate enclaves.’30 However, this celebration of shared cultures 
was qualified as one which had to be subsumed under the broader umbrella of ‘Australian’ 
culture, as implied by the statement ‘there is overwhelming support for the maintenance of 
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cultural traditions providing they are shared with the rest of the community and that they 
become part of Australian life’.31 Thus, difference was framed as acceptable for the role it 
played in constructing a collective and unifying Australian identity: ‘the richness of our diverse 
origins can contribute—as indeed they are already—to an evolving, but distinctive Australian 
culture’.32
Through this privatised construction of difference (what Ahmed describes as its 
fetishisation), the discourse of diversity commodified cultural difference, producing a 
static, non-contingent view of culture that was presented as freely available for individual 
consumption.33 This conception of culture divorced it from its historical formation together 
with the unequal power relations formed with it.34 Difference, then, far from signalling these 
inequalities, became an expression of individual identity. It was through diversity’s privatisation 
of difference that it was effectively and attractively depoliticised: the threat posed by culture 
as a mark of group affiliation was erased in the suggestion that it was not fixed but could be 
taken up or discarded according to the desire of the individual.35 By implication, ‘the diverse 
subject cultivate[d] the competencies necessary to live with difference understood as a set of 
variegated characteristics, but not as relations of power’.36 This assumption is evident in the 
Agenda’s claim that:
Different perceptions, values and modes of behaviour can contribute to social tension. 
There is an obligation on both sides to try to understand the other ... There is a need 
for opportunities to develop cross-cultural understanding.37
‘Good’ diversity was thus that form of difference which, in being adopted by the individual, 
contributed to their ability to live with others (and thereby served national interests); by 
implication, it was the adoption of ‘bad’ diversity that produced conflict. Difference was 
considered a valuable commodity only insofar as its consumption did not threaten some 
existing national framework, while political conflict arising from difference was reduced to acts 
of individual transgression.
Diversity was thereby figured in neoliberal terms as a resource, both economically and 
socially, and the government positioned as the manager of this resource ‘for everyone’. It 
was thus framed as a facilitator of ‘opportunities’, implicitly suggesting that the proper 
management of individuals would result in their acquisition of cultural competency and 
thereby secure social harmony. This articulation of the state as a neutral manager reflected the 
neoliberal moralisation of efficiency and productivity over and above the defence of particular 
interests (including ethical ones). This rhetoric of management was profoundly depoliticising 
in its emphasis on objective knowledge and calculated outcomes. In particular, it presented 
the regulation of difference in terms of good and bad diversity as an apolitical process; the 
normative framework against which these terms were defined—the paradigm in which 
good and bad diversity could make sense—remained unchallenged. In doing so, difference 
as diversity was stripped of its political significance and instead placed in service to the 
reinforcement of a no-longer-threatened national framework.
Ultimately, then, it was the construction of cultural difference as individual, private identity 
that allowed for its reconfiguration as diversity, a commodified resource which located national 
cohesion in individual competence and thereby justified state intervention in the management 
of this resource. This in turn depoliticised political conflict as the failure of individuals to 
acquire cultural competency and legitimated their regulation for the national benefit. 
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Subordinating difference
The later years of the Howard government were marked by several significant events—the 
Tampa affair and the 9/11 attacks which preceded the Howard government’s re-election 
in 2001, the 2002 Bali suicide bombings and the Cronulla riots of 2005. These moments 
are often identified as catalysts for the growing preoccupation with national identity and 
border protection that characterised the politics of the decade. However, such analysis 
tends to obscure the continuity in the Howard government’s political logic which, if it is 
acknowledged, is generally attributed to the personal political agenda of Howard himself.38 
The multicultural policy of this period is thus analysed in terms of either social conservativism 
or economic neoliberalism, but not their intersection. This kind of analysis is incomplete 
because it fails to articulate the continuity in the relationship between liberalism and 
difference in the multicultural policies of the Hawke and Howard governments. Attempts 
to justify the privileging of Anglo-Australian culture have always underlined the rationality 
of multicultural policy in reconciling difference with national identity; both the Hawke and 
Howard governments sought to negotiate it in their multicultural policies by appealing to 
the universality of liberal democratic principles as a uniting, culturally neutral framework. 
In particular, the Howard government’s emphasis on a united Australia cemented by core 
Western values built upon the earlier multicultural policy’s terms of individual freedom, 
privatised culture and depoliticised difference within a neo/liberal framework. With the 
advent of the ‘war on terror’, however, the popular narrative of Islam against the West brought 
increased visibility to this framework and its particular entrenchment in Western culture. 
This allowed for a much more explicit assertion of the cultural hierarchy underlying earlier 
iterations of multiculturalism, which was expressed in terms of Australian values. 
Although Howard was notoriously disapproving of multiculturalism and actively 
avoided using the term, a year after the Coalition’s successful bid for government saw the 
establishment of the National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC), whose primary 
task was to recommend a policy framework ‘aimed at ensuring that cultural diversity is a 
unifying force for Australia’.39 This new focus on multiculturalism as a source of unity was a 
reiteration of Howard’s longstanding position that multiculturalism could only be tenable if 
it was underpinned by a common (British-derived) Australian ethos, rather than upholding 
difference. This insistence on a united Australia, with its underlying code of cultural hierarchy, 
was clearly at play in the reconfiguration of multiculturalism attempted by the council 
through Multiculturalism: The Way Forward, a discussion paper outlining the NMAC’s terms 
of reference, and Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness, a report 
of the council’s findings. The NMAC’s reconstruction of multiculturalism as a ‘unifying force 
for Australia’ involved two distinct moves: subsuming multiculturalism under the umbrella 
of liberal democratic citizenship and rebranding this new type of citizenship ‘Australian 
multiculturalism’ by linking such democratic institutions specifically to British-Australian 
culture. In order to do this, and thereby ameliorate the ‘divisiveness’ of earlier multicultural 
policy, the legitimacy of state recognition of collective cultural difference was negated through 
an emphasis on formal equality, most bluntly in the report’s denial of structural inequality 
when it stated ‘our society does not guarantee equal outcomes’.40 The Howard government’s 
conception of multiculturalism followed its antecedent in targeting individual freedom but 
went further than previous policy in depoliticising difference, denying completely the political 
recognition of collective cultural difference due to its characterisation of individual freedom as 
homogeneous treatment. Collective cultural difference was now completely removed from the 
public sphere.
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It was this privatised construction of difference that underpinned the government’s defence 
of multiculturalism as an evolution of Australia’s political traditions:
The freedom that our democracy guarantees gives space for the cultural diversity in 
Australian society, so it is our democracy and our expectation that ‘citizens’ respect and 
adhere to its principles that are the key ingredients of a unifying Australian tradition 
which Australian multiculturalism retains.41 
Diversity here was a result of individual liberal freedoms since, being depoliticised, it could be 
constructed as compatible with these freedoms instead of a threat to them. Thus—echoing the 
National Agenda—the report asserted the place of multiculturalism as subsumed under a liberal 
democratic framework:
While Australian multiculturalism values and celebrates diversity, it is not an ‘anything 
goes’ concept since it is built on core societal values of mutual respect, tolerance and 
harmony, the rule of law and our democratic principles and institutions.42
This repositioning of multiculturalism as an inevitable (and laudable) result of liberal freedom 
allowed it to be framed as an inclusive and unifying force, since it was now absorbed into a 
uniquely Australian citizenship whose universal appeal provided the social ‘glue’ of the nation: 
‘The values of Australian multiculturalism form one dimension of the values which make up 
Australian citizenship which is built on a set of common civic values, rights and obligations 
that can unify Australians.’43
It was this linkage of liberal democracy, nominally a universal institution, to Australian 
identity particularly that formed the core attempt of these papers to affirm the unifying 
capacity of multiculturalism; hence its rebranding as ‘Australian multiculturalism’ (what has 
been termed the ‘culturalization of secular liberalism’).44 This tension between the apparent 
universality of liberal freedoms and the desire for a uniquely Australian identity is evident in 
the claim: ‘These basic principles—freedom and openness—define some common ground. 
They are, in one sense, timeless but in practice they derive from Australian experience.’45 The 
desire to ground liberal democracy in the Australian nation was achieved through an emphasis 
on the British origins of these institutions, which were afforded a central role in constituting 
the Australian identity. While the Hawke government’s multicultural policy also noted the 
legacy of British institutions to Australia, this was taken much further in the NMAC report, 
which not only identified this British heritage but suggested it bestowed a cultural privilege to 
those of British descent:
Australians whose origin is wholly or partly from Great Britain and Ireland can take 
special pride in their heritage, for its substantive contribution to the development and 
success of Australian society. This is exemplified in the underlying philosophy and 
principles and the essential components of Australia’s democratic system, which is the 
foundation on which our society has been built.46 
A cultural hierarchy was established here in which the cultural identities of the ‘non-
British’, migrants or otherwise, were subordinated to that of the Western-coded native core, 
who was inherently and exclusively vested with the capacity to unite the Australian nation 
through its historical relationship to Australia’s political values.47 The discussion paper exposed 
this implicit cultural privileging when it noted: 
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not all community standards and values are or can be enshrined in legislation. It is also 
important to recognise that law is not simply a matter of legislation; ultimately it is a 
matter of morality, of values and standards.48 
The apparent universality of the political framework uniting the nation was here revealed to be 
culturally specific.49 This characterisation of the unity of the nation maintained its foundation 
in a British heritage, in line with the previous policy of assimilation, merely shifting the 
significance of this heritage from a racial to a political one. Thus, the attempt to particularise 
multiculturalism as a specifically Australian form of liberal democratic citizenship engaged 
with a kind of ‘new nationalism’ that was coded in a cultural hierarchy.50 
Regulating difference: the Australian citizenship test
This emphasis on ‘core’ Australian values increased in the later years of the Howard 
government. In the wake of the 2005 London bombings, Howard claimed that immigrants 
had ‘an obligation to ... unconditionally embrace and imbibe the attitudes of this society’ and 
that failure to do so would legitimate a revocation of their citizenship.51 The Cronulla riots, 
which were prompted by white Australians looking to ‘cleanse’ Cronulla Beach of Middle 
Eastern men, provided a new opportunity to reinforce the language of values. Reflecting on 
the violence, Howard declared, ‘all Australians have a civic responsibility to support the basic 
structures and values of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality’.52 
While the rise of this ‘values’ discourse is often studied as a product of these events, we might 
reverse the order of analysis to consider instead how the discourses analysed so far in the 
policies of both the Hawke and Howard governments produced a context in which ‘core’ 
Australian values, having been linked to supposedly universal standards of liberal democratic 
freedom, were effectively depoliticised; that is, they were placed above political contestation 
because they were said to be universal. As a corollary, ‘other’ cultures were constructed as 
lacking these values, thereby justifying the exclusion of any collective political identity that 
was not aligned with the ‘core’ or mainstream Australia. The innovation of the Howard 
government’s articulation of this values discourse was in yoking it to the neoliberal technology 
of responsibilisation, locating the guarantee of liberal democratic freedoms not in the state 
but the virtuous citizenry and their private relationship to the nation, a configuration which 
particularly implicated the migrant and justified the regulation of their ‘commitment’ to 
national values.53 It thereby rationalised a citizenship test—exclusive by definition—on the 
grounds of its capacity to foster inclusion.54
The notion of virtuous citizens securing the public benefit is not a new one and indeed, 
according to Brett, has always been a cornerstone of Australian Liberal political thought.55 
However, this earlier form of the virtuous citizen was conceptualised in terms of individual 
moral duties towards others within a community. Its reappearance during the Howard years 
constituted a similar moralisation of citizenship seeking to emphasise individual obligations 
over rights, but it was distinct for its vertical conceptualisation of such obligations as flowing 
from the individual to the state rather than horizontally between members of a community, 
reflecting the neoliberal construction of individual virtue in terms of independence from state 
aid. It is for this reason that in its more recent iteration, individual obligations were directed 
specifically towards the nation, as defined through private attachment to national ‘core’ values. 
This reconfiguration of citizenship was evident both in the government’s rhetoric leading 
up to the introduction of the Citizenship Test and in the policy documents produced after 
its implementation. For instance, the Test resource booklet Becoming an Australian Citizen 
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contended ‘[m]odern citizenship also rests on sentiments of nationhood and enduring 
attachment to what Australians hold in common’.56 It was on this affective level that liberal 
freedoms could be secured, and social cohesion consequently became the result of individual 
emotional compliance.57 There was thus a conflation between public acts and private values, 
which is evidenced by the constant slippage between the two, such as Howard’s assertion 
that ‘all Australians have a civic responsibility to support the basic structures and values of 
Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality’.58 Furthermore, according to 
Andrew Robb, Parliamentary Secretary for Immigration, this private dimension had a public 
function:
This sense of shared values is the glue that binds our nation together. It involves the 
maintenance of a shared national identity ... A shared identity is not about imposing 
uniformity. It is about a strong identification with a set of core values.59
Once more, values were presented as things to feel ‘strong identification’ with on a private 
level, in order to serve a public good, with the implication that failure to do so was a public 
transgression: ‘A sense of shared values is our social cement. Without it we risk becoming a 
society governed by coercion rather than consent’.60 This, ultimately, was the proposition of the 
discourse of values: liberal freedoms were guaranteed not by an interventionist state but by the 
affective dimensions of the polity. It was only through the private adoption of particular values 
that individuals could be considered capable of the kind of self-governing that ensured the 
functioning of a ‘free’ society in the neo/liberalist terms of minimal state interference.61
The Howard government’s defence of a citizenship test was always centred on the claim 
that it would aid migrants to more fully participate in Australian life and thereby secure social 
cohesion. As the discussion paper Australian Citizenship: Much More than a Ceremony claimed: 
‘An understanding of the Australian way of life ... will better equip migrant and refugee settlers 
to build new social links’, adding ‘[s]uch an understanding will assist social cohesion and 
successful integration into the community’.62 By implication, migrants specifically were charged 
with the responsibility for acquiring these values (since Australian citizens were by definition 
inherently endowed with it) and were therefore responsible for social cohesion, with the 
corollary that social divisions too were a result of their failings. It was in this way that calls for 
integration were justified; this particular construction of migrants implied that they lacked the 
kind of values which were inherent to Australians and which were integral to the safeguarding 
of national cohesion. As Robb suggested: 
new and emerging communities, who increasingly come from cultures far different 
to our Australian culture, are effectively being told that they have no obligation to do 
their best to become ‘Australian’. Advocating the equality of cultures, or a community 
of separate cultures, fosters a rights mentality, rather than a responsibilities mentality. 
It is divisive.63 
Here, the maintenance of other cultures was presented as a threat because they were 
necessarily ‘divisive’, suggesting that these cultures were incompatible with Australia’s own. 
More visibly than its predecessors, this discourse articulated a private, static notion of culture 
as the container of essential values—where Western culture was uniquely endowed with 
the values of liberal freedom—and thereby created a necessarily antagonistic relationship to 
cultural difference. Howard made this oppositional stance clear: 
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We know what our enemies think and what they are capable of. They hate our 
freedoms and our way of life. They despise our democratic values. They have nothing 
but contempt for a diverse society which practises tolerance and respect.64
In this Othering of non-Western cultures and their construction as inherently oppositional 
to an Australian one, cohesion was possible only through the insistence on a shared identity 
of ‘core values’ which, in their close identification with Western culture, necessarily enforced a 
cultural hierarchy. The rhetoric of values was thus a more visible expression of the discourses 
at play in earlier migrant policy. Through their reinforcement of a cultural hierarchy, these 
discourses created a division between those in whom the capacity to be self-governing was 
naturalised and those in whom it was not, and whose regulation by a citizenship test was thus 
justified under the terms of freedom itself. 
The Howard government’s configuration of cultural difference was thus an extension of 
the earlier discourse of diversity, which privatised and depoliticised difference. However, this 
discourse was now articulated through a particularly neoliberal framework, with two particular 
implications. First, in its valorisation of formal equality it doubly removed collective cultural 
difference from the public sphere. Second, by depoliticising difference in this way it was able 
to more clearly assert both the place of multiculturalism as subordinate to a liberal democratic 
framework and the close relationship of this framework to Australian culture and its ‘core’ 
values. As a result, migrants became targets for regulation, which was effected through a 
citizenship test that placed the responsibility for national cohesion on their adoption of private 
values.
Conclusion
This article has been concerned with both discerning the terms by which a neo/liberal 
political rationality deals with the problem of difference and how these terms were able to 
accommodate the implementation of a citizenship test within the rubric of an ‘inclusive’ 
multicultural Australian citizenship. In the very act of delimiting a political (and national) 
body, the institution of citizenship is necessarily engaged in a process of exclusion. In order 
to reconcile this with an increasingly diverse Australian population, the Hawke and Howard 
governments both deployed the discourses of a neo/liberal political rationality which claimed 
to be universally inclusive, but which also accommodated the assertion of a core Western-
coded Australian identity. In particular, continuity was identified in the constructions of 
citizenship by both governments, in their privatisation and depoliticisation of cultural 
difference and reaffirmation of the primacy and incontestability of a core Australian identity. 
It was due to this particular configuration of ‘universal’ liberal values as the ‘core’ values of 
Australian national identity that both governments were able to insist on the necessity of 
their adoption by migrants in order to promote social cohesion. Moreover, this affirmation 
was depoliticised and configured not as an act of cultural imperialism or political domination 
but as an inclusive articulation of citizenship. Both governments, in their attempts to address 
difference, contributed to a framework which constructed a particularly liberal notion of the 
problem of difference, including the tension inherent to this problem between individual 
freedom and collective cultural difference. Within this framework, Australian culture was 
uniquely capable of producing ‘good’ neo/liberal subjects and, in this way, migrants became 
specific targets for regulation in order to secure national cohesion. The Citizenship Test 
thus came to be a legitimate solution to the problem of difference as a tool for promoting 
inclusion and, likewise, its regulation of migrants was configured as an inclusive act in the 
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name of individual freedom. Exclusion was thus perpetuated despite the development and 
affirmation of a formally inclusive framework. This contradiction suggests that, in order to 
theorise the ways in which citizenship and national identity work to produce exclusion, it is 
critical to first interrogate the norms against which such exclusion is defined. Doing so makes 
clear the problems inherent to accounts of Australian citizenship that assume a simplistic 
division between the Hawke and Howard governments, between liberal politics and neoliberal 
economics, and between inclusive and exclusive constructions of citizenship.
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